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Abstract
The economic analysis of tax-base equalization-grants from central to local governments sug-
gests that the transfer mechanism distorts scal policies by providing incentives to local gov-
ernments to set excessively high tax rates. In this paper, we extend the analysis by allowing
taxpayers to lobby the policy makers for reductions of their own tax burdens. In principle, the
distortions spurring from the lobbying activity should mitigate those caused by the equaliza-
tion program. In contrast, we show that taxpayers lobbying amplies the distortions of the
equalization mechanism. The degree of scal equalization can then be adjusted to alleviate the
e¢ ciency costs of lobbying.
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1 Introduction
Transfer programs from central to sub-national governments, aimed at scal equal-
ization, represent an important feature of public sector nance in many states with
multiple levels of government. The rationale for scal equalization comes from the fact
that local tax bases, as well as local expenditure needs, are not generally uniformly
distributed in the various jurisdictions. As a result, large disparities in the burden of
taxation, as well as large disparities in public expenditure benets, for otherwise sim-
ilar individuals living in di¤erent regions would emerge at the local level, unless some
corrective policies are undertaken. The primary role of equalization grants is then that
of reducing the di¤erentials in scal capacities and expenditure needs of the various
local jurisdictions, thus enhancing the working of the federation both on equity and
e¢ ciency grounds.1
A particular, but relevant, type of scal equalization programs, namely those aimed
at tax-base equalization, has received a great deal of attention both in the theoretical
and in the empirical literature. The interest lies in the fact that programs of this
type are run in some important federal countries, like Canada and Germany. The
aim of tax-base equalization is that of reducing the disparities of regional per capita
tax bases (scal capacities) on own-source tax revenues.2 In general terms, each local
government is entitled to a grant which depends on the di¤erence between the average
(of all local governments) standard tax revenue and its standard tax revenue. However,
standard tax revenues depend on e¤ective tax bases, which in turn depend on e¤ective
tax rates. Therefore, if local tax bases are elastic, the equalization program gives
the local governments an incentive to set tax rates that are higher than the optimal
ones. The argument, clearly exposed by Smart (1998), is simple. An increase in local
tax rates, by reducing local tax bases, increases the gap between the average and the
local government standard tax revenues, thereby augmenting the grant from the central
government. For empirical analysis of this issue, see Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2002)
and Smart (2007) for Canada, and Buettner (2006) for Germany.
Following this line of research, some authors (see, e.g., Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bu-
covetsky and Smart, 2006; Rizzo, 2008), have observed that the distorting incentives of
scal equalization should be confronted with the incentives of opposite sign arising from
horizontal tax competition among local governments. Clearly, if the two e¤ects cancel
out each other, the conditions for allocative e¢ ciency might be restored. However,
1See Dahlby and Wilson (1994) for the analysis of the optimal design of grant schemes based on the
equalization of the social marginal cost of raising tax revenue across jurisdictions.
2Another type of scal equalization programs are those based on the equalization of tax revenues
(e.g., the German interstate transfer system). In this paper, we focus only on tax-base equalization.
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subcentral scal policies su¤er also from sources of distortions which originate from
the political process. Indeed, as forcefully pointed out by Boadway (2004, p. 244):
... the agenda involved in taking political considerations into account in the design of
an equalization system is a daunting one, and has yet to be exploited.In this paper,
we take on this research agenda, by focusing on the incentives o¤ered to local policy
makers by taxpayerslobbying.
Our premise is that local tax policies, even in the absence of equalization, can be
distorted by the activities of pressure groups that lobby the policy makers for lower
tax rates. If tax-base equalization is added to the picture, incentives for higher taxes
come into play. Since the two sources of distortion push tax policy towards opposed
directions, one could be lead to expect that tax policy in the presence of both dis-
tortions turns out to be more e¢ cient than in the presence of only one distortionary
source. In contrast to this presumption, we show that, in general, lobbying by taxpayers
exacerbates the distortions arising from tax-base equalization programs.
Our analysis is based on a simple public nance model, in which a set of identical
local authorities belonging to a federation nance local public expenditure by taxing
incomes accruing to two types of production factors, while the central authority runs
a transfer program aimed at tax-base equalization. In order to focus on the interplay
between the distorting incentives of lobbying and those of scal equalization on local
scal policy, we abstract from horizontal tax competition issues, by assuming that the
owners of the taxed production factors supply only in their region of residence, and that
they are immobile across regions. Moreover, by focusing on the case of identical regions,
our analysis addresses only the e¢ ciency aspects of lobbying and scal equalization,
abstracting from their equity implications.
We take as benchmark case the optimal policy that would be set by a benevolent
local policy maker in the absence of lobbying and scal equalization. In this case,
optimality is dened by a standard Ramsey rule, by which relative tax rates are a
function of the relative supply elasticities of the taxed production factors, with tax
rates inversely related to elasticities. We then derive modiedRamsey rules under
the incentives of lobbying and/or scal equalization, in order to asses the directions of
the distortions. Our analysis shows that lobbying and scal equalization do not simply
pull tax policy towards di¤erent directions. Rather, they impact on scal policy in
ways which are fundamentally di¤erent. While scal equalization lowers the perceived
absolute levels of the marginal cost of public funds, thereby providing incentives to
raise taxes above their optimal levels, lobbying usually distorts the relative marginal
cost of public funds, thereby giving incentives to set a distorted tax structure.
The di¤erent impact that lobbying and scal equalization have on the marginal
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costs of public funds is the key factor in driving our results. Concerning the structure
of taxation, while lobbying by two antagonist groups which are equally powerful has no
impact on scal policy (since there is no impact on the relative marginal cost of public
funds), tax-base equalization at uniform rates provides incentives to raise taxes above
their optimal levels (since it lowers the absolute levels of the marginal costs of public
funds). Lobbying by two groups which are not equally powerful leads the policy maker
to reduce taxation on the more powerful group and to raise it on the less powerful group
(since the perceived marginal cost of taxation is lower on the former group than on the
latter). In contrast, the impact of non-uniform scal equalization (which, in addition
to lowering the absolute levels of the marginal costs of public funds, it also changes
their relative structure), can take a variety of forms, depending on the elasticity of
substitution between the taxed production factors. For instance, scal equalization of
only one tax base leads to tax increases on both tax bases in the case of a Cobb-Douglas
production function; instead, with a linear or a Leontief technology, while the tax rate
of the equalized tax base increases, that of the non-equalized tax base decreases.
Lobbying and scal equalization bear di¤erent implications also with respect to the
level of local public good provision. By distorting the relative marginal costs of public
funds, which are an increasing and convex function of tax rates, lobbying increases
the average marginal cost of public funds, and therefore its nal e¤ect is to lower
public good provision. On the contrary, scal equalization always lowers the average
marginal cost of public funds, thereby giving incentives to raise taxation and public
good production.
Although our analysis suggests that taxpayerslobbying for lower taxation does not
generally o¤set the pressures for higher taxes which are caused by scal equalization,
it also shows that by properly di¤erentiating the degrees of equalization on local tax
bases the central government in charge of the equalization mechanism can improve the
e¢ ciency of local scal policies which are distorted by the pressure of lobbying groups.
In particular, when taxation is distorted in favor of a particularly powerful lobby group,
it is e¢ ciency enhancing to set a higher degree of scal equalization on the tax base of
the more powerful group than on that of the less powerful group, because the incentives
provided by scal equalization o¤set those provided by lobbying.
The theoretical literature on scal equalization transfers can be traced back to the
works of Buchanan and Goetz (1972), Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski (1974),
Boadway and Flatters (1982). In these works, like in part of the subsequent literature,
emphasis is given to ine¢ ciencies in the allocation of the population as a consequence
of local scal externalities in the presence of perfect mobility of the population. In
this setting, the role of transfers is to internalize the scal externalities. More recent
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contributions, e.g. Dahlby (1996), Sato (2000) and Albouy (2012), extend the previous
models by assuming imperfect mobility of the population and distortionary taxation.
While the literature which is more closely related to the object of this paper, sur-
veyed above, addresses the e¢ ciency aspects of scal equalization, other strands of
the literature focus on di¤erent aspects. Lockwood (1999) and Bordignon, Manasse
and Tabellini (2001) focus on redistribution among regions in a setting of asymmet-
ric information in which, because of moral hazard and adverse selection, the optimal
equalization transfers are second best. Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008) examine how
scal capacity equalization impacts on the accountability of local politicians. Recent
empirical research stresses the importance of political incentives on the allocation of
grants: Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) focus on electoral incentives, while Levitt and
Snyder (1995), Larcinese, Rizzo and Testa (2006), and Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro
(2008), focus on the partisan alignment hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 examines the incentive e¤ects of scal equalization on local pub-
lic policy in the absence of lobbying by taxpayers, which is introduced in the following
Section 4. A numerical example, presented in Section 5, illustrates how tax-base equal-
ization and taxpayerslobbying impact on e¢ ciency. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Our theoretical framework combines some features of the models developed by Persson
and Tabellini (2000, chapter 12) for the analysis of the political-economic determinants
of capital and labor incomes taxation, with some features of the models used by Smart
(1998) to examine the distortions on local tax policy that may be caused by tax-revenue
equalization mechanisms.
2.1 The economy
Consider a federation composed of a given number of identical local jurisdictions. In
each region, two types of goods are produced: a private good, Y , and a local public
good, G. Good Y is produced using two factors of production: labor, L, and capital,
K. The production function, Y = F (K;L), is quasi-concave and linearly homogeneous
(i.e., it exhibits constant returns to scale). As for the public good, it is produced using
the private good as the only input, by means of a linear technology that transforms
one unit of good Y into one unit of good G. The private good serves also the role of
consumption good and that of numeraire good. All markets are perfectly competitive.
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The population resident in each region is composed of two types of agents: workers,
that supply labor, and capitalists, that supply capital. Both groups are composed of
identical agents. Let nw, 0 < nw < 1, and nc = 1   nw, be the mass of the group of
workers and capitalists, respectively. Also, all agents are assumed to be immobile, which
means that they supply their own production factor only in their region of residence.
The individuals belonging to the group of capitalists take their economic decisions
over a two-period span. In the rst period, they decide how to allocate an exogenous
endowment of a given commodity between consumption, ~xc, and capital supply (or
savings), ~k.3 Normalizing the endowment to unity, the rst period budget constraint
is ~xc = 1   ~k. In the second period, capitalists consume the principal plus interest
income, net of taxation. The second period budget constraint is xc = (1 + (1   t)r)~k,
where xc is second period consumption, r is the interest rate (or the rental price of one
unit of capital), and t is the ad valorem tax rate on interest income, t 2 [0; 1].
Preferences of capitalists are represented by the utility function:
uc(~xc; xc; G) = (~xc) + xc + b(G), (1)
where the strictly concave function (~xc) represents the utility of rst period consump-
tion, and the strictly concave function b(G) represents the utility of the public good,
which is enjoyed in the second period. Quasi linearity of the utility function (1) implies
that all income e¤ects fall on the demand for second-period consumption.
Taking G, t and r as given, the representative capitalist solves:
max
~k
(1  ~k) + (1 + (1  t)r)~k. (2)
The capital supply function, ~ks(r; t), that solves problem (2) is dened by the rst
order condition:4
x(1  ~k) = 1 + (1  t)r. (3)
To ensure an interior solution, we assume that lim~k!1 x(1  ~k) = +1, x(1) = 0.
It is immediate to see that capital supply is increasing in r, and decreasing in t, since
~ksr =  (1  t)=xx > 0, ~kst = r=xx < 0.
Workers supply labor and consume only in the second period. Their preferences
are represented by the utility function:
uw(xw; h;G) = xw + (h) + b(G), (4)
3For capitalists, all rst period variables are denoted by a tilde.
4Throughout the paper, subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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where xw and h are consumption and leisure, respectively, and the strictly concave
function (h) represents the utility of leisure time. Quasi linearity of the utility function
(4) in xw implies the absence of income e¤ects both on labor supply5 and on the demand
for the public good; all income e¤ects fall on the demand for the consumption good.
The endowment of time is normalized to unity; hence the time constraint is h+l = 1,
where l is labor supply. Let w denote the wage rate. Labor income, wl, is taxed at a
proportional tax rate  ,  2 [0; 1]. The individual budget constraint is: xw = (1 )wl.
Therefore, taking G,  and w as given, the representative worker solves:
max
l
(1  )wl + (1  l). (5)
The labor supply function, ls(w; ), that solves problem (5) is dened by the rst
order condition:
(1  )w = h(1  l). (6)
To ensure an interior solution, we assume that liml!1 h(1  l) = +1, h(1) = 0.
It is immediate to see that labor supply is increasing in w, and decreasing in  , since
lsw =  (1  )=hh > 0, ls = w=hh < 0.
Next we turn to the production sector. A large number of prot-maximizing com-
petitive rms, the mass of which is normalized to one, demand labor (in the second
period) and capital (in the rst period) to produce the private good (in the second
period). There is no depreciation of capital input during the one-period production.
Therefore, taking r and w as given, the representative rm maximizes its prots by
solving the problem:
max
K;L
F (K;L)  wL  rK. (7)
Given that the production function is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one,
the rst order conditions of problem (7):
FK(K;L) = r, (8)
FL(K;L) = w, (9)
dene only the optimal capital-labor ratio as a function of production factors relative
gross prices. The supply of output is perfectly elastic, with zero prots in equilibrium.
5The quasi-linearity assumption is made for analytical convenience and can be relaxed. Note also
that empirical estimates of the impact of income taxes on labor supply nd weak income e¤ects (see,
e.g., Gruber and Saez, 2002).
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Remark 1 The focus on workersand capitalistsincomes taxation, while not void
of some practical interest, is primarily adopted as a useful illustrative device. In fact,
problems (2) and (5) dening, respectively, the supply of capital and labor inputs are
formally equivalent. This means that the model can accommodate a wide variety of
circumstances, each one tting a specic context of interest. For instance, the model
can be framed in terms of two types of labor inputs (e.g., skilled and unskilled), or
di¤erent types of capital inputs (like land, or natural resources, in which case one
should accommodate the model by setting inelastic supplies of the production factor).
Therefore, the key feature of our theoretical framework does not lie in the specic
example we consider. Rather, it lies in the fact of allowing for two distinct local tax
bases on factor incomes, which are linked by means of a production function.
Remark 2 The existence of two distinct groups, each one composed of identical
agents, implies that it is not e¢ cient to employ distortionary income taxes to nance
the public good. A uniform lump sum tax (if between-groups redistribution is not
an issue), or a pair of group-specic lump sum taxes (if also some between-groups
redistribution is to be achieved), would be rst best e¢ cient. However, following part
of the literature (e.g., Smart, 1998), we take the identical agents setup as a convenient
shortcut for representing a more realistic, but also more complex world, of heterogenous
individuals, in which distortionary income taxes are to be employed because of the lack
of information on individual skills and endowments that would allow for the use of
personalized rst best lump sum taxes.
2.2 Market equilibrium
Using the market clearing condition nc~ks = K to substitute for ~ks = K=nc into Eq.
(3), and using the market clearing condition nwls = L to substitute for ls = L=nw into
Eq. (6), we obtain the following equations:
x(1 K=nc) = 1 + (1  t)r, (10)
h(1  L=nw) = (1  )w. (11)
The equilibrium of labor and capital markets is then dened by solving the equation
system (8), (9), (10) and (11) in the unknown r, w, K and L. Notice that, by Walras
law, if the labor and capital markets clear, also the market for the private good clears.6
6By adding the second period aggregate budget constraints of capitalists and workers we get ncxc+
nwxw = (1 + r)nc~k + wnwl   trnc~k   wnwl. By adding the local government budget constraint,
G = trnc~k + wnwl, we get ncxc + nwxw + G = (1 + r)nc~k + wnwl. Using the fact that, when the
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Denote the equilibrium prices and quantities as w( ; t), r( ; t), L( ; t), K( ; t).
Let:
 = (1  )nwxxFLL + (1  t)nchhFKK + hhxx > 0. (12)
In Appendix A.1, it is shown that the labor income tax  impacts on market equi-
librium as follows:
w = 
 1nwwxxFLL > 0, K
r =  Lw < 0, (13)
K = 
 1nwncw(1  t)FLL(L=K) < 0, (14)
L = w

=FLL +K

 (L
=K) < 0. (15)
The taxation of labor income bears a negative impact on both labor and capital utiliza-
tion, with a negative impact on production. Note that while an increase in  reduces
the equilibrium gross interest rate r, it increases the equilibrium gross wage w, mean-
ing that the tax on labor income is partially shifted to producers. The rst negative
term in Eq. (15) accounts for the substitution of labor for capital into production as
a consequence of labor taxation; this term vanishes if the production function is of
Leontief type.
The tax on interest income t impacts on market equilibrium in a specular, way (see
Appendix A.1):
rt = 
 1ncrhhFKK > 0, L
wt =  rtK < 0, (16)
Lt = 
 1nwncr(1  )FKK(K=L) < 0, (17)
Kt = r

t =FKK + L

t (K
=L) < 0. (18)
2.3 Income and welfare levels
Denote as
R( ; t) = r( ; t)K( ; t), W ( ; t) = w( ; t)L( ; t), (19)
the per capita gross income of capitalists and workers, respectively. Using the results
derived above, it is immediate to see that
R = r

K
 + rK < 0, W

t = w

tL
 + wLt < 0, (20)
capital and the labor markets clear, nc~k = K and nwl = L, and the fact that Y = rK +wL, we nally
obtain that ncxc + nwxw +G = K + Y , i.e., market clearing in the market for the private good.
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i.e., the labor (resp. interest) income tax has a negative impact on capitalists (resp.
workers) income. On the contrary, the sign of the direct impacts is in general ambigu-
ous, since:
Rt = r

tK
 + rKt = 
 1ncrhh(FKKK
 + r) + rLt (K
=L), (21)
W  = w

L
 + wL = 
 1nwwxx(FLLL
 + w) + wK (L
=K). (22)
Using the rst order conditions (8) and (9), it is immediate to see that su¢ cient
conditions for Rt < 0 andW  < 0 are FKKK+FK > 0 and FLLL+FL > 0, respectively
(these conditions hold, for instance, when the production function is of Cobb-Douglas
type). The case Rt > 0 andW  > 0 may occur when a large degree of complementarity
between labor and capital into production (as in the limit case of Leontief technology)
is coupled with su¢ ciently inelastic supplies of the two factors. Note, however, that
aggregate income, R +W , is always decreasing in both tax rates. This means that
when the direct e¤ects Rt and W  are positive, then the indirect ones, R and W t ,
which are always negative, outweighs the former.
Next we turn to welfare levels. By inserting the equilibrium quantities into the
respective utility functions (1) and (4), the per capita welfare of capitalists and workers
can be written as:
vc( ; t; G) = (1 K=nc) + (1 + (1  t)r)(K=nc) + b(G), (23)
vw( ; t; G) = (1  L=nw) + (1  )w(L=nw) + b(G). (24)
By di¤erentiating Eqs. (23) and (24) with respect to the tax rates, and by applying
the envelope theorem, we see that both the labor and the interest income tax bear a
negative impact both on workers and on capitalists:7
ncvc = (1  t)Kr < 0, (25)
ncvct = ((1  t)rt   r)K < 0, (26)
nwvw = ((1  )w   w)L < 0, (27)
nwvwt = (1  )Lwt < 0. (28)
3 Optimal local governments scal policy
In this section, we set the benchmark by considering the choices taken by benevo-
lent local policy makers. The distortionary incentives that may arise from taxpayers
lobbying and/or from tax-revenue equalization grants are examined in Section 4.
7To see that Eq. (26) is negative, use Eqs. (12) and (16) to show that (1  t)rt   r =   1(hh+
nw(1   )FLL)xxr < 0. To see that Eq. (27) is negative, use Eqs. (12) and (13) to show that
(1  )w   w =   1(hh + nc(1  t)FKK)xxw < 0.
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We assume that each local government takes a Utilitarian objective function, by
which workers and producers welfare levels are linearly added. Social welfare is then
dened as:
~V ( ; t; G) = ncvc( ; t; G) + nwvw( ; t; G). (29)
Letting public good expenditure to be dened from the local government budget con-
straint,
~G( ; t) = W ( ; t) + tR( ; t), (30)
the problem solved by the benevolent local policy maker is that of maximizing Eq. (29)
subject to Eq. (30).
Using Eqs. (25)(28), and di¤erentiating Eq. (30), the rst order conditions with
respect to the tax rates are:
bG( ~G) =  
~V
~G
) bG( ~G) =  (1  t)K
r + ((1  )w   w)L
W  + W  + tR
, (31)
bG( ~G) =  
~Vt
~Gt
) bG( ~G) =  (1  )L
wt + ((1  t)rt   r)K
R + W t + tRt
. (32)
By using Eqs. (13)(15), (16)(18), (20)(22), these rst order conditions can be
written as:
bG =
(   t)Lw +W 
W  + (   t)wL + ww=FLL + (wL=K + tr)K
, (33)
bG =
(t  )Krt +R
R + (t  )rtK + trrt =FKK + (trK=L + w)Lt
. (34)
By equating the right hand sides of Eqs. (33) and (34), we get the equation that
denes the optimal tax structure, for given level of public good provision. Using Eqs.
(13)(15) and (16)(18), after some manipulations, we get:
t

=
nwwKxx
ncrLhh
. (35)
By using the fact that:
xx =  
(1  t)ncr
K"k
, hh =  
(1  )nww
L"l
, (36)
where "k  0 and "l  0 are the elasticities of capital and labor supplies, respectively,
we nally obtain the following relation between the two tax rates:
t
1  t"
k =

1   "
l. (37)
This is a Ramsey type formula for e¢ cient taxation, which shows "l R "k implies
t R  . That is, the less elastic tax base should bear a lower tax rate than the more
elastic tax base, since in this way the excess burden for nancing the public good is
minimized.
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Remark 3 The assumptions of (i) a Utilitarian social welfare function and (ii) a
constant marginal utility of income for the agents belonging to the groups of workers
and capitalists, imply that the optimal tax policy derived above serves only e¢ ciency
considerations. Distributional considerations between the two groups of taxpayers play
no role.
4 Taxpayerslobbying and scal equalization
In this Section we examine how scal policy may be inuenced by taxpayerslobbying
and by the incentives o¤ered by a mechanism of equalization transfers.
4.1 The lobbying game
We assume that the lobbying activity takes a legaland publicform, in which each
group of taxpayers (by means of an association representing their interests) makes
monetary o¤ers to the policy maker (in the form of campaign contributions, for in-
stance) conditional on changes in scal policy. This buying inuenceapproach for
modelling lobbying behavior has been popularized in the context of common agency
(many principals, one agent) games by Dixit et al. (1997) and Grossman and Helpman
(1994, 2001), building on previous work by Bernheim and Whinston (1986a, 1986b).
The lobbying game evolves along two stages. In the rst, the taxpayersassociations
(the principals of the game) present to the policy maker a menu of o¤ers, that is a series
of contributions, each one associated to a given scal policy, from which the policy
maker, upon acceptance of the o¤er in the second stage of the game, can make the
preferred choice. The game is solved backward. Formally, we assume that each lobby
group presents to the policy maker truthful, or compensating, contribution functions,
in the way dened by Dixit et al. (1997). A truthful contribution function is shaped
along an indi¤erence curve of the lobby group, so that any given change in the policy
instrument brings about a corresponding change in the contribution that is equal to
the change in the payo¤ of the lobby group. Truthful contributions have the property
that the set of the best responses of each principal to the contribution functions (not
necessarily truthful) of the other principals always contains a truthful contribution
schedule (Dixit et al., 1997, proposition 2).
The truthful contributions o¤ered by workers and capitalists are:
C( ; t; G;w; w) = wmax f0; nwvw( ; t; G)  wg , (38)
C( ; t; G;c; c) = cmax f0; ncvc( ; t; G)  cg , (39)
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respectively, where w  0 and c  0 are scalars representing the net payo¤ of the
lobby group.8 The parameters w 2 [0; 1] and c 2 [0; 1] capture, in a reduced form,
how e¤ective is each group in its lobbying activity. At one end, the closer to zero the
parameter  is, the less e¤ective is the group, say because many of its members behave
as free riders. At the other end, when the group is very strong because most of its
members actively participate in the lobbying process, then  is close to one. That is,
the parameter  represents the degree of inuence that the lobby group is able to exert
on the policy maker. Note nally that each contribution schedule is conditional on all
scal policy instruments, and not only of the tax directly a¤ecting the group.
Under the inuence of lobbying, the objective function of the policy maker is then
equal to:
~V ( ; t; G) + C( ; t; G;w; w) + C( ; t; G;c; c), (40)
where ~V (:) is the social welfare function dened in Eq. (29).
4.2 Tax-base equalization-grants
Public good expenditure is now dened by the following local government budget con-
straint:
G( ; t; e; l; k) = W  + tR + e( ; t; e; l; k), (41)
where e( ; e; l; k) is an unconditional grant from the central government.
As for the tax-base equalization mechanism, it takes the following form:
e( ; e; l; k) = e+ l
 
W   W + kt   R  R , (42)
where e  0, l 2 [0; 1], k 2 [0; 1]. The term e represents the lump sum component of
the grant.9 The other terms represent the equalization of scal capacities, with l and
k the parameters expressing the degree of equalization of local tax bases, respectively
labor and interest income. In the latter case, given the average tax base of all regions,
R, and the average tax rate, t, the equalization grant covers the share k of the gap
between the standardized average tax revenue, t R, and the standardized tax revenue,
tR, of the local government. The same mechanism applies to labor taxation.
8We solve only for the second stage of the lobby game, in which scal policy is set under the incentives
of the contribution function. We do not solve for the rst stage of the game, in which the scalars w
and c are determined. The reason is that we are only interested in the e¢ ciency consequencies of
lobbying, and not on its distributional impact.
9The lump sum component e of the transfer is a measure of the vertical scal gap.
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Notice that an increase in one of the tax rates, by reducing both tax bases W  and
R, determines, coeteris paribus, an increase of the grant. That is, the equalization of
each one of the tax bases provides an incentive to over-tax both tax bases.
Remark 4 In our framework with identical regions, the equilibrium is always sym-
metric, with e(:) = e for all regions, since  =  , W  = W , t = t, R = R, for all
regions. That is, in equilibrium there is no redistribution of resources among identical
regions. Hence, in principle scal equalization should not be used, since it is costly
in terms of e¢ ciency. However, the focus of the paper is precisely the evaluation of
the interplay between the distortions arising from scal equalization with those arising
from taxpayerslobbying, leaving aside distributional considerations.
4.3 Local governments scal policy
Ignoring the non-negativity constraint on the contribution function, in stage two of the
lobby game the local policy maker chooses the tax rates ( ; t) and public good supply
G to maximize the objective function:
V ( ; t; G) = (1 + c)ncvc( ; t; G) + (1 + w)nwvw( ; t; G), (43)
subject to the budget constraint (41) and to the equalization transfer mechanism (42).
Note that the optimal scal policy derived in Section 3 is encompassed as a special
case by setting c = w = 0 and l = k = 0. If c 6= w, c  0, w  0, then the
policy maker maximizes a distorted social welfare function.
Using Eqs. (25)(28), and Eqs. (13) and (16), the impact of a change in the tax
rates on social welfare can be expressed as:
V = [(1  )(1 + w)  (1  t)(1 + c)]Lw   (1 + w)W , (44)
Vt =   [(1  )(1 + w)  (1  t)(1 + c)]Krt   (1 + c)R. (45)
By di¤erentiating Eq. (41) subject to Eq. (42) we get:
G =W
 + (   l)W  + (t  kt)R , (46)
Gt = R
 + (   l)W t + (t  kt)Rt . (47)
In computing these expressions, we made the small jurisdictions assumption, which
implies that the local government takes the average tax rates  and t as given when
setting its own tax rates.
In a symmetric equilibrium (recall that in our model with identical regions there
are only symmetric equilibria),  =  and t = t. Hence, we can write Eqs. (46) and
13
(47) as:
G =W
 + lW  + t
kR , (48)
Gt = R
 + lW t + t
kRt , (49)
where we dene
l = 1  l, k = 1  k,
to shorten notation. Also, let:
 = ncc + nww.
By substituting the expression for G from Eq. (41) into Eq. (43) for social welfare,
and then di¤erentiating with respect to the tax rates, we obtain the following pair of
rst order conditions, which dene the equilibrium scal policy:
(1 + )bG =   V
G
, (50)
(1 + )bG =   Vt
Gt
. (51)
As we show in Appendix A.2, these rst order conditions can be manipulated to
obtain the following equations:
(1 + )bG =
  [(1  )(1 + w)  (1  t)(1 + c)]Lw + (1 + w)W 
W  + (l   tk)wL + lww=FLL + (lwL=K + tkr)K
,
(52)
(1 + )bG =
[(1  )(1 + w)  (1  t)(1 + c)]Krt + (1 + c)R
R + (tk   l)rtK + tkrrt =FKK + (tkrK=L + lw)Lt
.
(53)
By equating the right hand sides of Eqs. (52) and (53), we get an equation that
allows for the determination of the relative tax rates, i.e., one tax rate as a function of
the other one. By comparing the resulting expression with that given in Eq. (37), one
should be able to assess how lobbying and scal equalization distort the tax rates. By
considering also the local government budget constraint (41), one should then be able
to solve also for the absolute tax rates and the level of public good supply, and therefore
to assess whether lobbying and scal equalization determine under- or over-provision
of the public good. Unfortunately, a full characterization of the answers to the above
questions is not possible at this level of generality. Hence, in what follows we look
at some specic but important cases, and then return to the general formulation by
looking at some numerical simulations. But before doing this, we state a useful result
that can be obtained from Eqs. (52) and (53).
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Proposition 1 If workers and capitalists are equally e¤ective in lobbying, i.e., w =
c, then lobbying has no impact on the scal policy of the local government.
The proof follows immediately by setting w = c =  =  into Eqs. (52) and (53);
then the factor (1 + ) appears on both sides of the equations and can be simplied.
Lobbying is e¤ective in distorting scal policy only when the two groups of taxpayers
are not equally strong in making pressure on the policy maker.
Lobbying without scal equalization
Consider rst the special case in which there is no scal equalization (i.e, l = k = 0,
which implies l = k = 1), but there is lobbying. Then the formula (37) linking tax
rates at the equilibrium scal policy is amended as follows:
t
1  t(1 + 
w)"k + c =

1   (1 + 
c)"l + w. (54)
As expected, this formula shows that taxation tilts in favor of the more powerful
group. In formal terms, let (0; t0) be the set of equilibrium tax rates that can occur in
the absence of lobbying and of scal equalization, i.e., all pairs of tax rates satisfying
Eq. (37). Let (L; tL) be the set of equilibrium tax rates that can occur in the presence
of lobbying but in the absence of scal equalization, i.e., all pairs of tax rates satisfying
Eq. (54). It is then immediate to see that tL Q t0 for L = 0 whenever c R w.10
The more powerful lobby group succeeds in lowering its own tax rate at the expense of
the other group. This distortion in the tax mix, by determining an increase in the cost
of public funds, results in a lower level of tax revenue and public good provision with
respect to the optimal level.
Fiscal equalization without lobbying
Next we examine the special case in which there is no lobbying (i.e., c = w = 0;
however, note that Proposition 1 implies that the same results hold in the case of
equally e¤ective groups, i.e., c = w > 0), but there is scal equalization (i.e., l > 0,
k > 0, which implies l < 1, k < 1). In this case, the formula linking in equilibrium
the two tax rates turns out to be as follows:
t

=
(nwFLLxx + n
cFKKhh)L
l   nwwxx(1  l)
(nwFLLxx + n
cFKKhh)K
k   ncrhh(1  k)

K
L

. (55)
10More precisely, tL Q t0 for L = 0 i¤ c R w for tax rates such that tax revenue is on the
increasing side of the La¤er curve. At the bliss point of the La¤er curve, it is tL = t0, L = 0, for all
c > 0, w > 0.
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This expression obviously reduces to Eq. (35) for l = k = 0 (no scal equal-
ization). It then shows that the equilibrium tax structure is always t =  under full
tax-base equalization (i.e., l = k = 1). That is, under full equalization the policy
maker has no incentives to di¤erentiate the tax rates according to the elasticities of
the factor supplies, and therefore she sets a uniform tax rate on the two tax bases.
The result is due to the fact that the higher the degree of equalization the lower is the
elasticity of tax bases perceived by the policy maker; with full equalization, tax bases
are perceived as inelastic, and therefore their elasticities play no role in determining
the chosen tax structure.
Concerning the level of taxation and public good supply, scal equalization deter-
mines the well-known incentive to overtaxation, since it reduces the perceived cost of
public funds by the policy maker.
Additional interesting aspects on the relation between scal equalization and the
structure of the equilibrium tax policy are illustrated in the numerical simulation in
Section 5 below, where we consider what happens when the two tax bases are equalized
at di¤erent rates.
Linear production function
Thanks to its analytical simplicity, the case of a linear production technology allows for
the joint analysis of the impact on scal policy of both lobbying and scal equalization.
With perfect substitutability between capital and labor, the production function
is linear in input quantities, with constant marginal products, FL = FL > 0, FK =
FK > 0; hence, FLL = FKK = 0. The equilibrium gross factor prices, w = FL,
r = FK , are independent of tax rates, and each tax rate bears a negative impact
only on the equilibrium quantity of the taxed input. That is, w = r = K = 0,
L = nww=hh < 0, and wt = rt = Lt = 0, Kt = ncr=xx < 0.
Taxation impacts on the objective function of the policy maker and on public good
provision as follows:
V =  (1 + w)W , G =W  + lW  , W  =  
W "l
1   ,
Vt =  (1 + c)R, Gt = R + tkRt , Rt =  
R"k
1  t .
Provided that W  > 0, R > 0, the rst order with respect to the tax rates can then
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be written as:
bG(G) =
1 + w
1 + 
1
1  1  (1  l)"l
, (56)
bG(G) =
1 + c
1 + 
1
1  t1 t(1  k)"k
, (57)
where public good provision is determined by the budget constraint:
G =  FLL
() + t FKK(t) + e. (58)
By equating the right hand sides of Eqs. (56)(57), we get the following equation,
which denes the structure of the equilibrium tax rates:
t
1  t(1 + 
w)(1  k)"k + c = 
1   (1 + 
c)(1  l)"l + w. (59)
The structure and the interpretation of Eq. (59) are similar to that of Eq. (54),
with the added feature of scal equalization. While the latter equation contains the
e¤ective factor-supplies elasticities, the former contains those perceived by the policy
maker as a result of the scal equalization mechanism.
Concerning the equilibrium tax structure, the modiedRamsey formula (59) then
shows that, coeteris paribus, taxation is lower for the production factor (i) which is
more elastic in supply, (ii) which is supplied by the more powerful lobby group, and
(iii) which tax base is subjected to the lower degree of equalization.
Eqs. (56)(57) also allow for a clear evaluation of how lobbying and scal equal-
ization impact on total tax revenue and therefore on public good supply. In fact, for
each tax rate the equation equates the marginal benets of public goods (on the left
hand side) to the perceived marginal cost of public funds (on the right hand side). The
latter depends on two factors: the relative intensity of lobbying (the rst factor on
the right hand side of the equation) and the perceived elasticity of the tax base (the
second factor on the right hand side of the equation). Eqs. (56)(57) clearly show that
lobbying impacts on the relative weights of the marginal costs of public funds (provided
that w 6= c), since by denition it is:
nw
1 + w
1 + 
+ nc
1 + c
1 + 
= 1,
for all (w; c). Lobbying then determines an increase in the average marginal cost of
public funds, because marginal costs are an increasing and convex function of tax rates
and the equilibrium tax mix is distorted away from its optimal level.
On the contrary, scal equalization, by lowering the perceived elasticity of tax
bases, always reduces both the individual and the average marginal costs of public
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funds, therefore giving incentives to the policy maker to raise taxation and public good
production.
Overall, our analysis then shows that taxpayerslobbying for lower taxation does
not counteract the distortions for higher taxation caused by scal equalization, because
the former tends to distort the tax mix whereas the latter tends to cause over-taxation.
However, as we show by means of a numerical simulation in Section 5 below, the degrees
of scal equalization of the two tax bases can be used to reduce the distortions caused
by lobbying.
Inelastic supply of a production factor
Consider now the case in which one of the production factors is xed in supply. Land
as capital input, or some types of natural resources, could t into such a special case.
In the context of our model, to x ideas suppose that the supply of capital is inelastic,
while that of labor continues to have a positive elasticity.
In the absence of both lobbying and scal equalization, it is then optimal, in general,
to tax the rent accruing to the xed factor at the maximum feasible level (100%, or a
lower level below it, if there is a political or legal constraint imposing an upper ceiling
on the tax rate), and then to use residually the tax on the income of the elastic factor
to equate the marginal benets of public goods with the marginal cost of public funds.
The explanation of this result is that while the capital tax is an e¢ cient lump sum tax,
that on labor is distortionary.
The fact that the tax rate on capital income is already at its maximum level drives
all the results when lobbying and/or scal equalization are added to the picture. In
the absence of scal equalization, only capitalists have a direct incentive to lobby, with
the intent of inducing the policy maker to reduce the tax on capital and to increase
that on labor. Workers have no incentive to lobby, but only if capitalists do not lobby,
since the tax on capital cannot be further increased. However, if capitalists do lobby,
then also workers are forced to lobby, in order to limit the inuence of the antagonist
group.
In the absence of lobbying, tax-base equalization of the tax on the xed factor
(capital) gives an incentive to local policy makers to over-tax the elastic factor (labor),
since interest income is decreasing in the level of labor income taxation. This is the
type of result that emerges in the model set up by Smart (1998, Section 4.2) to ana-
lyze the distortions arising from the equalization of resource taxes, an issue which is
highly debated in the context of the mechanism of scal equalization among Canadian
Provinces.
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These results show that the direction of the distortion in tax policy is always the
same for lobbying and tax-base equalization. If the suppliers of the inelastic production
factor (capital, in our example) are more powerful lobbyists than the suppliers of the
elastic factor (labor, in our example), then the local policy maker is induced to lower
the e¢ cient tax on the inelastic factor and to raise the distortionary tax on the elastic
factor. This distortion is reinforced by the incentives o¤ered by scal equalization. If,
on the contrary, workers are the more powerful lobbyists, then lobbying has no impact
on scal policy (since the tax on capital is already at its maximum level), while scal
equalization tends to distort the labor tax upward. It is also possible to show that,
when capitalists are more powerful lobbyists than workers, an increase in the degree
of equalization of the tax on capital income is bad for e¢ ciency,11 a result that bears
some interest for the ongoing debate about the equalization of resource taxes in Canada
(Smart, 2005, 2006).
5 A numerical example
The purpose of the numerical example is that of shedding light on some issues that
could not be addressed in general terms in the previous Section. In particular, the
interplay between lobbying and scal equalization in distorting local scal policy, and
the impact of these distortions on public good supply.
For capitalists, the utility of rst period consumption ~xc is specied as:
(~xc) = ~xc  Ac "
k
1 + "k
(1  ~xc)(1+"k)="k , "k > 0, Ac > 0.
Therefore, in terms of capital supply ~k we have:
(1  ~k) = 1  ~k  Ac "
k
1 + "k
~k(1+"
k)="k ,
x(
~k) = 1 +Ac~k1="
k
, xx(~k) =  
Ac
"k
~k(1 "
k)="k .
Capital supply is of constant elasticity, "k = "k. In fact, from the rst order condition
1 + (1  t)r = 1 +Ac~k1="k ,
we obtain capital supply and its elasticity with respect to the interest rate r as:
~ks(r; t) = ((1  t)r=Ac)"k , "k =
~ksrr
~ks
= "k.
11The details of this result, which is obtained by means of numerical simulations, are available from
the authors upon request.
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For workers, the utility of leisure h is specied as:
(h) = 1 Aw "
l
1 + "l
(1  h)(1+"l)="l , "l > 0, Aw > 0.
Therefore, in terms of labor supply l we have:
(1  l) = 1 Aw "
l
1 + "l
l(1+"
l)="l ,
h(l) = A
wl1="
l
, hh(l) =  
Aw
"l
l(1 "
l)="l .
Labor supply is of constant elasticity, "l = "l. In fact, from the rst order condition
(1  )w = Awl1="l ,
we obtain labor supply and its elasticity with respect to the wage rate w as:
ls(w; ) = ((1  )w=Aw)"l , "l = l
s
ww
ls
= "l.
Benets of public good provision are specied as:
b(G) = B

   1G
( 1)=,  > 0,  6= 1, B > 0,
bG(G) = BG
 1=, bGG =  B

G (1+)=,
where  is a measure of the the elasticityof the demand for public goods.
Given these specications, there is a perfect symmetry between the individual wel-
fare levels of workers and capitalists, but for the elasticity of supply, that can di¤er
between the two groups. In fact:
vw( ; t; G) = (1  )wl + (1  l) + b(G) =
= (1  )wl + 1 Aw "
l
1 + "l
(l)(1+"
l)="l + b(G),
vc( ; t; G) = (1 + (1  t)r)~k + (1  ~k) + b(G) =
= (1  t)r~k + 1 Ac "
k
1 + "k
(~k)(1+"
k)="k + b(G).
The production function takes the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form:
F (K;L) = A

L  + (1  )K   1 , A > 0, 0 <  < 1,   1 < .
The parameter  is related to the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital
as  = 1=(1 + ). Three standard specications belonging to this class of production
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functions which are considered in the numerical simulations are the following:
! 0,  ! 1, F = ALK1 , Cobb-Douglas,
! +1,  ! 0, F = A min fL; (1  )Kg , Leontief,
!  1,  ! +1, F = A [L+ (1  )K] , Linear.
At one end, with Leontief technology there is perfect complementarity between cap-
ital and labor. At the other end, with Linear technology the two inputs are perfect
substitutes into production.
In the numerical simulation, for given models parameters, the solution of a six-
equation system  Eqs. (10) and (11) dening the optimal supplies of labor and
capital, Eqs. (8) and (9) dening the optimal capital/labor ratio, Eqs. (52) and (53)
dening the equilibrium scal policy  is computed in the unknowns L, K, w, r, 
and t. Given the equilibrium tax rates, public good supply is then computed from the
budget constraint (41).12 In all the numerical simulations, we set Aw = Aw = A = 5,
 = B = nw = :5,  = :8.
The rst set of simulations is shown in Table 1. In columns I-XII, the elasticity of
supply is the same, "k = "w = :5, for capital and labor, whereas in columns XIII-XXIV
we consider a higher elasticity for capital, "k = :6 > :4 = "w. In columns I-IV and
XIII-XVI, the production function is of Cobb-Douglas type ( = :9999), in columns V-
VIII and XVII-XX it is linear ( = 100), and nally in columns IX-XII and XXI-XXIV
it is of Leontief type ( = :0099). For each specication of the supplies elasticities
and of the elasticity of factors substitution, four types of equilibrium scal policies
are computed: no lobbying and no scal equalization (w = c = l = k = 0),
lobbying by capitalists only in the absence of scal equalization (w = 0, c = :5,
l = k = 0), uniform scal equalization of 75% of tax bases in the absence of lobbying
(w = c = 0, l = k = :75), and nally equalization of capital tax base only in the
absence of lobbying (w = c = 0, l = 0, k = :75). The results shown in Table 1 can
be summarized as follows:
 The lobbying group is more e¤ective in obtaining a reduction of its own tax rate
when the production function is Leontief (see columns X and XXII), whereas it
causes a larger increase in the tax levied on the non-lobbying group when the
production function is linear (see columns VI and XVIII).
 In the absence of lobbying, a uniform level of scal equalization distorts tax rates
upwards, it preserves the ranking of tax rates if the elasticities of supplies are
12The Excel spreadsheet used for the numerical simulation is available from the authors upon request.
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di¤erent, but the gap between the tax rates is larger the larger is the elasticity
of substitution between the production factors.
 In the absence of lobbying, if only one tax base is equalized (however, the result
holds in general for di¤erent degrees of equalization), then (a) both tax rates are
distorted upwards under Cobb-Douglas technology (see columns IV and XVI),
(b) the tax rate of the equalized tax base is distorted upward whereas that of
the non-equalized tax base is distorted downward under linear technology (see
columns VIII and XXX), (c) the tax rate of the equalized tax base is distorted
downward whereas that of the non-equalized tax base is distorted upward under
Leontief technology (see columns XII and XXIV). The apparently odd result (c)
is due to the fact that with a Leontief technology tax bases are increasing in their
own tax rates whereas are decreasing in the tax rate of the other tax base.
The second set of simulations, which are shown in Table 2, examines the interplay
between lobbying and scal equalization. Columns I-X refer to linear technology, while
columns XI-XX to Cobb-Douglas one. In columns I-V and XI-XV the elasticities of
factor supplies are identical ("k = "w = :5) whereas in columns VI-X and XVI-XX they
are di¤erent ("k = :6, "w = :4). In the case of linear technology, the simulations show
that by properly setting the degrees of scal equalization it is possible to dampen the
distortions caused by lobbying. In fact, column II shows that lobbying by capitalists
distorts tax rates, by lowering t from 31.8 to 24.3%, and by increasing  from 31.8
to 39.6%. By equalizing 50% of the capital tax base, and by not equalizing the labor
income tax base, column III then shows that the tax rate t raises to 30.4% while the
tax rate  lowers to 36.5%, with a welfare gain with respect to the previous situation.
Column IV then shows that it does not pay to increase the equalization rate to 70%
in order to realign tax rates at the same level, as implied by the Ramsey rule in the
absence of distortions. More importantly, column V shows that scal equalization
at the uniform level of 25% underperforms, in terms of social welfare, than the non-
uniform rates of 50% for capital and zero for labor. Columns VI-X of Table 2 show
that in the case of linear technology the same results hold also when the elasticities
of supplies are not uniform. The remaining part of the Table, columns XI-XX, show
instead that the above result vanishes in the presence of a Cobb-Douglas technology,
which shows a much lower degree of input substitutability than the linear one. The
simulations show that the equalization of the tax base belonging to the lobby group
has the e¤ect of raising both tax rates, which precludes the possibility of correcting the
distortions caused by lobbying by means of di¤erentiated scal equalization.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analyze how the incentives arising from tax-base equalization-grants
interact with the incentives arising from taxpayers lobbying in distorting the scal
policy of the recipient local governments. Although lobbying and scal equalization
provide incentives that push in opposed directions  the former for lower, and the
latter for higher, taxation  our analysis shows that in general the two sources of
distortion reinforce each other in terms of e¢ ciency losses. At the most, the central
authority can di¤erentiate the degrees of equalization of the local tax bases to partially
compensate for heterogeneous abilities of the lobby groups in distorting local scal
policies.
Our analysis is cast in a framework of local tax bases which are immobile across
the local jurisdictions. In future research, it could be interesting to examine how the
results would be a¤ected by allowing factors mobility, which would introduce horizon-
tal tax competition among local governments. Another interesting extension of the
analysis would be to characterize the optimal degree of scal equalization of the two
tax bases, for a given average degree of scal equalization; the question then would be
the characterization of the optimal combination of scal equalization that minimizes
the e¢ ciency loss of the transfer program, for a given level of average equalization.
Finally, another interesting topic would be to address the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency
and equity in scal equalization, by introducing into the analysis heterogeneous local
jurisdictions.
Mathematical appendix
A.1 The impact of tax rates on market equilibrium
By substituting the equilibrium prices and quantities, w( ; t), r( ; t), L( ; t) and K( ; t),
into the equation system (8), (9), (10) and (11), we get the identities:
x(1 K=nc)  1 + (1  t)r, (A.1)
h(1  L=nw)  (1  )w, (A.2)
FL(K
; L)  w, (A.3)
FK(K
; L)  1 + r. (A.4)
Applying the implicit function theorem, by totally di¤erentiating Eqs. (A.1)(A.4) with
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respect to  , we get:
 xxK =nc = (1  t)r , (A.5)
 hhL=nw = (1  )w   w, (A.6)
FLKK

 + FLLL

 = w

 , (A.7)
FKKK

 + FKLL

 = r

 . (A.8)
Using the following properties of the production function, which is assumed to be linearly
homogeneous,
FLK =  K
L
FKK , FKL =   L
K
FLL,
FKK
FLL
=

L
K
2
, (A.9)
by solving the equation system (A.5)(A.8) for the unknown w , r

 , L

 and K

 , we obtain the
partial derivatives (13)(15) shown in the text.
Applying the implicit function theorem, by totally di¤erentiating Eqs. (A.1)(A.4) with
respect to t, we get:
 xxKt =nc = (1  t)rt   r, (A.10)
 hhLt =nw = (1  )wt , (A.11)
FLKK

t + FLLL

t = w

t , (A.12)
FKKK

t + FKLL

t = r

t . (A.13)
Using properties (A.9) of the production function, by solving the equation system (A.10)(A.13)
for the unknown wt , r

t , L

t and K

t , we obtain the partial derivatives (16)(18) shown in the
text.
A.2 The rst order conditions for optimal scal policy
The elements of Eqs. (50) and (51) can be manipulated as follows. Partial derivatives:
G =W
 + l(wL
 + wL ) + t
k(rK
 + rK ),
Gt = R
 + l(wtL
 + wLt ) + t
k(rtK
 + rKt ),
can be written as:
G =W
 + (l   tk)wL + lwL + tkrK ,
Gt = R
 + (tk   l)rtK + lwLt + tkrKt .
These in turn can be written as:
G =W
 + (l   tk)wL + lww=FLL + (lwL=K + tkr)K ,
Gt = R
 + (tk   l)rtK + tkrrt =FKK + (tkrK=L + lw)Lt .
Finally, using the latter expressions we get Eqs. (52) and (53).
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Table 1: Numerical simulations
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
ε^l 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
ε^k 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
λ^c 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,00
λ^w 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
α^k 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,75
α^l 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
t 0,3181 0,1769 0,3890 0,3477 0,3181 0,1923 0,3890 0,5458 0,3181 0,1392 0,3890 0,0093
τ 0,3181 0,4475 0,3890 0,3477 0,3181 0,4522 0,3890 0,2311 0,3181 0,4364 0,3890 0,4834
G 0,4644 0,4532 0,5375 0,4964 0,4644 0,4485 0,5375 0,5042 0,4644 0,4640 0,5375 0,4649
r 2,5000 2,3393 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 1,9885 2,5000 1,7287
w 2,5000 2,6717 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 3,0126 2,5000 3,2737
K 0,2919 0,3103 0,2764 0,2855 0,2919 0,3178 0,2764 0,2383 0,2919 0,2926 0,2764 0,2926
L 0,2919 0,2717 0,2764 0,2855 0,2919 0,2617 0,2764 0,3100 0,2919 0,2914 0,2764 0,2908
V tilde -0,7592 -0,7719 -0,7729 -0,7618 -0,7592 -0,7772 -0,7729 -0,7957 -0,7592 -0,7596 -0,7729 -0,7602
σ 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 100 100 100 100 0,0099 0,0099 0,0099 0,0099
XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX XXI XXII XXIII XXIV
ε^l 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40
ε^k 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60
λ^c 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,00
λ^w 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
α^k 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,75
α^l 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
t 0,2734 0,1288 0,3688 0,3086 0,2712 0,1341 0,3329 0,5045 0,2777 0,1167 0,3839 0,0086
τ 0,3608 0,4953 0,4022 0,3766 0,3583 0,4970 0,4281 0,2763 0,3657 0,4912 0,3844 0,5392
G 0,4680 0,4608 0,5393 0,4961 0,4692 0,4591 0,5397 0,5030 0,4657 0,4647 0,5380 0,4661
r 2,6293 2,4570 2,6802 2,6467 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5001 2,8748 2,3607 3,0800 2,1026
w 2,3771 2,5438 2,3319 2,3615 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,1257 2,6394 1,9214 2,8980
K 0,2807 0,3005 0,2610 0,2736 0,2728 0,3026 0,2587 0,2165 0,2951 0,2959 0,2796 0,2958
L 0,3105 0,2903 0,3000 0,3066 0,3173 0,2879 0,3030 0,3329 0,2960 0,2955 0,2809 0,2949
V tilde -0,7458 -0,7592 -0,7592 -0,7478 -0,7422 -0,7618 -0,7543 -0,7770 -0,7530 -0,7534 -0,7663 -0,7539
σ 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 100 100 100 100 0,0099 0,0099 0,0099 0,0099
Table 2: Numerical simulations
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
ε^l 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40
ε^k 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60
λ^c 0,00 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,00 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25
λ^w 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
α^k 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,70 0,25 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,90 0,25
α^l 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,25 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,25
t 0,3181 0,2429 0,3040 0,3459 0,2412 0,2712 0,1897 0,2462 0,3599 0,1827
τ 0,3181 0,3964 0,3650 0,3451 0,4406 0,3583 0,4385 0,4104 0,3620 0,4832
G 0,4644 0,4590 0,4813 0,4941 0,4770 0,4692 0,4677 0,4861 0,5136 0,4850
r 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000
w 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000 2,5000
K 0,2919 0,3076 0,2949 0,2859 0,3080 0,2728 0,2908 0,2784 0,2524 0,2923
L 0,2919 0,2747 0,2817 0,2861 0,2644 0,3173 0,3008 0,3068 0,3166 0,2910
V tilde -0,7592 -0,7653 -0,7609 -0,7614 -0,7706 -0,7422 -0,7488 -0,7444 -0,7494 -0,7548
σ 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX
ε^l 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40
ε^k 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60
λ^c 0,00 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,00 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25
λ^w 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
α^k 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,10 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,10 0,10
α^l 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10
t 0,3181 0,2384 0,2469 0,2400 0,2428 0,2734 0,1918 0,2025 0,1938 0,1986
τ 0,3181 0,3941 0,4124 0,3976 0,4036 0,3608 0,4397 0,4507 0,4418 0,4467
G 0,4644 0,4607 0,4753 0,4636 0,4684 0,4680 0,4669 0,4791 0,4692 0,4747
r 2,5000 2,4065 2,3987 2,4050 2,4025 2,6293 2,5291 2,5291 2,5291 2,5291
w 2,5000 2,5971 2,6055 2,5987 2,6014 2,3771 2,4713 2,4713 2,4713 2,4712
K 0,2919 0,3027 0,3005 0,3023 0,3016 0,2807 0,2923 0,2900 0,2919 0,2909
L 0,2919 0,2805 0,2767 0,2798 0,2785 0,3105 0,2992 0,2968 0,2987 0,2977
V tilde -0,7592 -0,7634 -0,7644 -0,7635 -0,7637 -0,7458 -0,7502 -0,7506 -0,7502 -0,7503
σ 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999 0,9999
